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Chapter 12
Implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive
in the Netherlands 
Robbert van het Kaar and Jan Cremers
1. Introduction
The Dutch case is particularly interesting because of the strong position
of works councils within Dutch companies, including in restructuring
situations. Implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive in the
Netherlands did not lead to new worker rights above and beyond what
was required. However, the general legislation on workers’ involvement
– the Works Council Act (WOR) – includes several articles relevant to
takeover situations. The WOR prescribes that companies – a target
company and the bidder, if Dutch – have to seek the advice of the works
council in relation to major corporate decisions, such as entering into a
transaction. For decisions regarding a change of control over the company
a mandatory advice procedure applies (WOR, Article 25). The works
council is bound by confidentiality. If a works council is not consulted in
accordance with the WOR rules, this can endanger or delay the execution
of the decision. If a management’s decision conflicts with the works
council’s advice or if the management has not properly informed it, a
works council can ask the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam court
to block the decision (Article 26). 
Usually, the central management of a target company will inform the
works council and look for its support for a deal. Similarly, the trade
unions are notified in case of acquisitions as prescribed by the so-called
‘merger code’. Once an offer is launched the workers’ representatives
(including the trade unions) have to be informed and consulted about the
offer. An examination of the case of Stork, which was the target of two
takeover bids, shows that works councils in the Netherlands can have a
substantial influence on the outcome of such bids. 
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2. Key elements of Dutch takeover regulations
Up until the 2000s public offers were dealt with on the basis of self-
regulation with supervision by a non-statutory regulator. In 2001 a
statutory body responsible for the supervision of public offers was created,
the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). Its main responsibilities
are the review and approval of offer documents and the monitoring of
compliance with the rules. The AFM is supposed to ensure that public
offers are publicly announced in good time. 
The Takeover Bids Directive has been implemented in a number of
different acts, including the Companies Act (Book 2 of the Civil Code) and
the Securities Act (Financial Supervision Act, FSA, and the Decree on
Public Offers). Implementation has not led to changes in the existing laws
on worker involvement. The legislation entered into force on 28 October
2007. Implementation brought the previous rules in line with the
minimum requirements of the Directive. The position of the AFM, as the
supervisor of the offer process, was confirmed and strengthened. 
Other important provisions were already to be found in the Decree on
Public Offers, the Works Council Act (WOR) and the SER merger code
(SER-fusiegedragsregels). Both the WOR and the merger code contain
clauses on confidentiality: works council members and union officials are
obliged to keep the information they are given confidential. The standard
rules in securities legislation (Articles 10 and 27 of the Decree on Public
Offers) stipulate that employee representatives may be informed only
when the offer is made public. Target companies with a registered seat in
the Netherlands are supposed to communicate their intention to issue an
offer to the employee representatives, or if there are none, to the
employees, as soon as this intention has been made public. This is too late
for employee representatives to be able to have meaningful influence and
therefore contradicts the general Dutch worker involvement legislation,
which requires that employees be informed and consulted at an early stage.
It has been debated whether securities law, more specifically the rules on
insider information and insider trading, is violated when employee
representatives receive information before the intention to issue an offer
is made public. The majority view before the securities legislation entered
into force was that securities law allows persons that, pursuant to their
function, are involved in the bidding process to be informed earlier than
the general public, on condition that they keep this information
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confidential. Because works councils definitely have a role in the bidding
process, they are entitled to timely information (as required in the WOR
and the merger code). However, the transposition of the takeover
Directive unambiguously contradicts this: employees may receive the
information only when the (intention to) bid is made public. It can be
argued that the postponement of information and consultation until the
moment the offer is made public is a violation of Article 14 of the takeover
Directive, which states that the Directive shall be without prejudice to
existing worker rights.
3. The role of employee representatives 
3.1 General information and consultation rights related
to takeovers
Every undertaking with 50 employees or more is obliged to set up a works
council with a range of information and consultation rights. The WOR
provides the works council with three main types of rights: information
rights, consultation rights and approval rights. Management must consult
the works council on all major issues, including plans to sell all or part of
the company or to take over other companies. On these issues the
employer must seek the views of the works council and delay taking action
for at least a month if the works council disagrees with the proposal.
During this period the works council can appeal to the Enterprise
Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam.
When the employer has neglected their information and consultation
duties, or has taken insufficient account of the interests of the employees,
the court may block the decision and even undo the steps taken to
implement the decision. There are several examples of mergers and
takeovers that were blocked in this way (however, none of these involved
listed companies).
Since 2010, the right of the works council to speak at the general meeting
of shareholders of public limited companies (both listed and unlisted) on
some major management decisions, including mergers, takeovers and
divestment, either taken by or to be approved by the general meeting, has
been enshrined in the Civil Code. However, there are no sanctions against
non-observance and the general meeting of shareholders is completely
free to ignore the expressed views. It is unclear to what extent works
councils make use of this right.
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In large companies a supervisory board appoints and dismisses
management and approves major management decisions. Works councils
have special nominating rights for one-third of the seats of supervisory
boards. Members of the supervisory board are supposed to act in the
interest of the company and the undertaking as a whole (also in case of
mergers and takeovers). They may not act as representatives of partial
interests, be it the interests of shareholders, banks or employees. As
neither employees of the company nor trade unionists dealing with the
company can be nominated, and nominees are often not familiar with
employees’ day-to-day concerns, this indirect representation of employees
at supervisory board level is not always effective.
3.2 Trade unions: merger code and right of inquiry
In the case of acquisitions (or mergers) that involve at least 50 employees,
the SER merger code applies. This code is not hard law, but rather a code
of conduct (soft law). At an early stage of the negotiations, trade unions
must be informed and consulted, both on the decision as such and on the
foreseen consequences for the employees. When the employer concerned
does not comply with their information and consultation obligations, the
unions can lodge a complaint with the SER Merger Conflicts Committee
(Geschillencommissie Fusiegedragsregels). 
In addition, both shareholders and unions can request the court to order
an investigation into companies when there are serious doubts about the
soundness of their policies. The arrangement covers both public and
private limited companies. The first step is to complain to the board
(executive and supervisory board) about the policy of the company and
give them a reasonable amount of time to change it. When there is no
change in policy – which is usually the case – a request to start an
investigation can be filed at the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam
Court. When the request is granted, the court appoints one or more
investigators, depending on the complexity of the issue. The request –
and the court’s assignment to the investigators – can refer to all or part
of company policy, for a longer or shorter period. When requested, the
investigator’s assignment can also cover related companies (subsidiaries,
parent company and so on). 
Since the revision of the law in 1994, the court can – if a request is made
to that end – take far-reaching measures to correct the state of affairs in
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the company, even before an investigation has started. These measures
may include dismissal of one or more members of the executive board or
the supervisory board; temporary appointment of one or more members
of the executive or supervisory board; temporary deviation from the
articles of association; and declaring certain decisions of the executive
board void. The report of the investigators is the basis for the verdict of
the court, whether there was mismanagement in the company or not. In
case of mismanagement, the court can – but is not obliged to – take
several measures, including the ones mentioned. 
Most of the cases involve small private limited companies. However, from
the end of the 1990s, the right of inquiry was applied to another type of
conflict, namely those involving issues of corporate governance. In one
such case, a listed real estate company defended itself against a hostile
takeover by an Australian company. The court ruled that the defensive
measure taken was a case of mismanagement. Although part of the ruling
was nullified by the Supreme Court, this court agreed that the lavish
golden parachute created by the management of the real estate company
for its own members could be considered mismanagement. Although this
case was started by shareholders, it might also have been initiated by the
unions. Other important cases were Stork (see section D) and ABN AMRO.
In the Stork case (in early 2007), the court on the one hand forbade the
use of defensive measures by the executive board against hedge funds and
on the other hand rejected the supervisory board dismissal demanded by
these hedge funds. In the ABN AMRO case, the court made the
controversial ruling that, once the executive board has publicly stated that
the company is open to a public bid, it should try to maximise shareholder
value. The Supreme Court later overruled this verdict and stressed that in
all circumstances the stakeholder approach has to be followed. In both
cases the unions and the works council successfully requested from the
court that they be considered an interested party.
3.3 Information and consultation of works councils with regard
to public offers 
As far as the decision to launch a public offer is concerned, at first sight
there are no problems with regard to the position of the works council of
the bidder. If the bidder is based in the Netherlands the advice of the
works council must be sought. Information and consultation should take
place before the public announcement of the offer. We have already noted
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that, according to the FSA and the Decree on Public Offers, the informa -
tion may be given no earlier than the moment the offer is made public. In
the legislative process, the government has tried to solve the tension
between securities law and worker involvement rights by stating that the
validity of the offer should depend on a meaningful consultation process
with the works council. This would, according to the government, result
in sufficiently meaningful consultation, albeit at a somewhat later stage
than in the case of types of mergers and takeovers other than public offers. 
The position of the works council in the target company is fundamentally
different. The main problem is that the decision to accept or refuse the
offer is not taken by the (executive board of the) company itself, but by
individual shareholders. There is in principle no legal right for the works
council to block decisions of these shareholders, or a right to be informed
and/or consulted on their intentions: information and consultation rights
can be implemented only vis-à-vis the executive board. Only in very
special circumstances is it conceivable that a major shareholder will have
information and consultation obligations (there is one court ruling to this
effect). Although this is first and foremost true for mergers that take place
through share transactions – as opposed to transfers of undertaking or
legal mergers – the problem is especially present in case of public offers,
due to the dispersed ownership of shares (with the added complication
that some 80 per cent of the shares in Dutch listed companies are held by
parties outside the Netherlands).
The question remains what the rights of the works council are with regard
to the position the executive board of the target company takes towards
the bidder. There appears to be a consensus that the works council has
the right of advice whatever the opinion of the executive board of the
target company is (support, opposition or neutrality). This would imply
that decisions of the executive board of the target company may be
challenged in court by the works council. It remains to be seen what the
effect of a court decision in favour of the works council would be: the court
decision only affects the stance of the executive board, not the decision of
the shareholders to transfer their shares. A court ruling in favour of the
works council will have much more effect when the bidder has made the
offer conditional on the support of the executive board of the target
company; then the works council of the target company effectively
influences the continuation of the bidding process itself. In practice, a
works council usually sides with its own management.
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3.4 Information and consultation of works councils with regard
to a hostile public offer
The central issue in case of a hostile public offer is whether the executive board
of the target company takes defensive measures against the bid (such as sus -
pending voting rights for shareholders or issuing new shares). In principle,
the works council of the target company has the right of advice with regard
to measures taken by the executive board to have an effect on the transfer of
ownership of the company. This includes the use of defensive measures in
case of a hostile takeover. Thus the works council of the target company may
either support or oppose defensive measures taken by the executive board
(or choose to be neutral). The main example is the issuing of new shares to a
'white knight' in such an amount that the white knight actually gains control.
In practice, the works council usually supports the defensive measures,
joining forces with the management and supervisory board of the target
company. This happened in 2007 at Stork. A recent exam ple is KPN, where
defensive measures were taken to fend off the Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim.
The SER merger code explicitly takes account of hostile public offers (that
is, a public offer without the consent of the executive board of the target
company). The bidder shall uphold the information and consultation
rights of the trade unions in case of a hostile offer in the same way as in
the case of non-hostile offers. According to the Code (Articles 5.2 end 5.3),
the bidder must notify the target company of the intention to launch the
offer at least 15 days ahead of the actual offer and the executive board of
the target company has to inform and consult the unions in the same way
as in other types of mergers. Again, these provisions are in violation of
the securities legislation that implements the takeover Directive and will
be abolished in the near future.
The SER merger code specifically takes account of takeovers by way of the
gradual acquisition of shares. Article 6 stipulates that the information and
consultation procedures should as much as possible be conducted as in
the case of a ‘normal’ merger, takeover or acquisition. 
Mention should be made of the duty to notify the crossing (both ways) of
a number of thresholds of shareholding (3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50,
60, 75 and 95 per cent, see Article 5:39 Wft) to the Financial Markets
Authority. As this information is made public, employees, works councils
and unions are able to get information on the build-up of portfolios of
shares by parties at an early stage.
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4. The Stork case – a plaything for ‘activist’ funds 
4.1 Some basic information
Stork N.V. machinery was founded in 1865 and was long seen as one of
the most innovative and progressive firms in the Netherlands. As early as
1881 the firm started a company pension fund and two years later an early
type of workers’ representation (a ‘kern’). In the late 1960s a period of
restructuring started as heavy industry declined, at national and global
level; total employment decreased from 26,000 in 1968 to 12,000 in 1983.
The firm made a remarkable come-back by shifting to ‘light’ industrial
production: engineering and supply for aviation and space travel, as well
as food systems and technical services. By 2007 the group had evolved
into a large company with over 80 subsidiaries. The total workforce
reached 13,300 employees spread over four divisions (textile print
machinery, chicken slaughter machinery, aviation technology and
technical services). Although the Stork group had a strong decentralised
company culture, with four divisions that could not be placed under the
same common denominator, the whole group functioned with one
‘identity’ with a long entrepreneurial history and tradition. 
Stork had a two-tier governance structure with an executive board and a
supervisory board. Based on the WOR extensive information and
consultation through the works council system was created after the
Second World War. The WOR rights, including codetermination, were
executed by the central works council for issues involving the entire group,
by unit works councils at the level of the strategic business units and by
works councils for the individual subsidiaries. The trade unions had a
strong position in the company and were recognised as the competent
partner that negotiated terms and conditions of employment through
well-established collective bargaining processes. The strength of workers’
involvement was demonstrated in the 1970s as the closure of two
ironworks was successfully blocked by industrial action. 
4.2 Description of the process
In 2006 the company, which was listed on the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange, came under heavy attack from two so-called ‘activist’ hedge
funds that had started with a participating interest in 2004 (Centaurus
and Paulson). Centaurus and Paulson demanded the break-up of the
Robbert van het Kaar and Jan Cremers
188 Takeovers with or without worker voice: workers’ rights under the EU Takeover Bids Directive
conglomerate. The funds wanted the company to concentrate on
aerospace activities and to sell off the other divisions. For all other
important stakeholders the idea of splitting up the group and
concentrating only on the aerospace operations was seen as a betrayal of
the aims of the founding fathers and not in the interest of all stakeholders,
including workers and customers.1 The management decided not to
respond to this demand and this decision was backed not only by the
supervisory board but also by the works council and the trade unions. But
when the demands of the hedge funds were tabled at the extraordinary
general meeting of shareholders on 12 October 2006, it became clear that
a large majority of the shareholders present did not agree with the
position of the board (‘no selling of divisions’). Further consultations
between Stork management and the two funds failed to result in an
agreement. The hedge funds reacted by calling for another extraordinary
general meeting of shareholders. One of the points on the agenda that
they wanted to table was a vote of no confidence in the leadership of the
group. The management response was to issue new preferential shares to
a foundation, with the primary goal of preserving the independence and
continuity of the company. The hedge funds’ response was to call for an
inquiry procedure in which they demanded the reversal of the share issue
(or at least a ban on any voting rights awarded to the new shares) and the
dismissal of the supervisory board that had taken the lead in this action.
In January 2007, the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal had to rule on the dispute between the two hedge funds and the
Stork group. The hedge funds asked the court to deprive the Foundation
(the owner of the preferential shares that had been established as a
defence wall) of its voting rights. Stork’s works council and the trade
unions sided with management in defending the company against a
takeover that would probably lead to a break-up. The works council asked
the court to suspend the voting rights of the hedge funds; the trade unions
defended the supervisory board against dismissal.2
Neither of the two main parties to the dispute achieved a complete victory;
the court granted to a certain extent the request submitted by the hedge
funds by reversing the share issue and prohibiting the defensive wall, but
the demand to dismiss the supervisory board was rejected. According to
the court, this would have been a too radical change in the group’s
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1. http://www.orinformatie.nl/?subject=news&id=126 
2. Largely based on van het Kaar (2007). 
strategy. Instead of a dismissal of the supervisory board, the court added
three members to this body with the task of mediating between the
conflicting parties through consultations and negotiations. The trade
unions and the workers considered that the court’s verdict constituted
support for the view that defines a company as a community of different
stakeholders who all have to be involved in important decisions, and not
primarily as a shareholder vehicle. Legal experts and analysts regard the
proceedings as a test case in relation to the increased rights of
shareholders: ‘the Enterprise Chamber intervened with immediate
measures mostly to preserve the status quo and allow for an orderly
process of debate and conflict resolution’ (Beckum et al. 2010). Since
2004 the rights of shareholders had been extended to the prerogative to
dismiss the supervisory board members; the court made clear that there
were certain limits to this right.3
Soon after this decision the British investor Candover stepped into the
race. A first effort in the summer of 2007 to acquire a majority of the
shares failed. One owner of a substantial part of shares (32 per cent, later
on extended to 43.5 per cent), the Icelandic food machinery group Marel
was interested in the food division and refused to accept the bid.
Centaurus and Paulson also evaluated the offered share price as too low.
The works council had been informed and had rendered positive advice
on the planned transaction as ‘a good step to allow Stork to continue with
its strategy’.4 During two months of negotiations with the executive board
and the supervisory board, including the three extraordinary supervisory
board members appointed by the court, agreement could be reached over
a takeover by Candover that was fully and unanimously supported on 28
November 2007. The hedge funds that had raised the level of participation
to 33 per cent of the shares backed the intended offer. 
In a joint press release by Stork and the investor it was said that the Stork
central works council had been informed and requested to review the
intended offer.5 A guarantee was given that existing rights would remain
in place, including employee codetermination, existing social plans and
collective agreements, and that there would be no negative employment
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3. http://www.fnvformaat.nl/jurisprudentie/jurisprudentie-verdieping/enqu%C3%
AAterecht/uitspraak-twijfel-aan-juist-beleid  
4. Intended recommended cash offer of EUR 47 per share for Stork, 26 June 2007,
http://hugin.info/130797/R/1135429/212877.pdf and recommended cash offer, 10 August
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZDmtIk.hkoY 
5. Offer for Stork, Candover Investment, press release, 28 November 2007.  
consequences. The supervisory board and the executive board spoke of a
constructive dialogue that had led to an agreement and recommended the
deal to the last shareholder meeting held on 5 January 2008. The central
works council delivered a positive opinion on the acquisition that was
declared unconditional on 17 January 2008. Soon after, Stork was de-
listed from the stock market. The chicken slaughter division was sold and
the other entities continued as separate companies.6
4.3 Evaluation
The coalition of the executive board, the supervisory board, the trade
unions and the central works council strengthened the involvement of
workers’ representatives in the whole process before the takeover took
place. However, this coalition could not prevent the partial break-up of
the group. The trade unions that organised strike actions in September
2007 against a split of the group were satisfied with the fact that there
would be no negative employment effects. But, although the ‘activist’
shareholders did not get their way, the unions together with the founders’
family regretted the outcome of a complicated and long fight over the
ownership of the group. A spokesperson of the family referred to a wall
painting in the old office, which dated back to 1892, that symbolised the
start of the social welfare system in the Netherlands with the statement:
‘Jointly we act, no struggle, but cooperation’. 
The first attacks by the hedge funds were countered with all possible
means. The central works council, together with the concerned unions,
signed up as interested party in the court case that was initiated by the
hedge funds, which was meant to break down the defence wall. The hedge
funds realised after this move that the works council was a stakeholder
that could not be ignored. The funds approached the works council for an
exchange of views as they formulated a vote of no confidence in the
executive and the supervisory board. The planned bid by Candover in
June 2007 received more positive acceptance from the council. But the
threat of a complete break-up remained. Although the implementation of
the Thirteenth Directive entered into force on 28 October 2007 and the
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6. The acquisition of Stork Food Systems by Marel received positive advice from the Stork
works council in 2008. In 2011 Candover sold the other divisions to the British private
equity company Arle Capital that already had shown interest in 2008. The separate divisions
are Stork Tech Services, Fokker Technologies and Stork BV. 
Dutch legislator had decided not to apply the new legislation to pending
cases, the intended offer was presented to the central works council. The
legal basis was Article 25 of the Works Council Act. In accordance with
the procedure to obtain the central works council's advice on the sale of
the food division, Stork and Marel had discussions with the central works
council as part of the advice process. The results of the deliberations were
laid down in a covenant.
In general terms the consultation rights of workers are too weak to
completely block this kind of turbulent hostile activity. However, the solid
position of the trade unions and works councils made it possible to
influence the process to a more positive outcome than the hedge funds
and activist shareholders had in mind. The protests in a broad coalition
with the use of all juridical means combined with workers’ voice made it
possible to counter the attack. In hindsight the works council is happy
about the de-listing: it has brought an end to the risks of hostile takeovers.
The attacks by the hedge funds led to a complicated fight that demanded
all the energy of the works council members (‘a lot of fuss that had nothing
to do with the core business of the company’).7
5. Concluding remarks
With regard to takeovers and acquisitions in general, the works council
in particular has strong information and consultation rights that are
enshrined in the Works Council Act. Trade union rights have no legal
status, but are contained in a ‘soft law’ code of conduct (which is presently
under revision).
In the case of public offers, the situation is more complicated. After the
implementation of the takeover Directive, it is against the law to notify
the works council and/or the unions of takeover intentions before the
public announcement of these intentions. The legislator did not consider
it problematic that these new rules are contrary to the existing legislation
on worker involvement because the agreement in principle between the
bidder and the target company can be made conditional on the required
involvement of the works council and/or the unions. In practice, however,
the delay will make information and consultation less effective.
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7. In an interview published in van Lammeren (2009). 
Apart from this, the position of the works council of the target company
is difficult. However, this is inherent in this type of acquisition, in which
not the management of the target, but individual shareholders take the
final decision. The work council can wield some influence, due to some
statutory influence on the stance the management of the target company
takes. This is especially important in the case of hostile takeovers.
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